An investment decision problem is studied, in a framework where the government offers insurance against the possibility of the price of a risky asset falling drastically. The problem is considered under different informational scenarios, i.e., information quality, under which agents have to infer the state of fundamentals of the economy. Changes in information quality is shown to affect equilibrium prices despite no concomitant changes in the fundamentals, creating excess volatility. The possibility of government intervention is shown to increase equilibrium prices, which can be ordered as a function of information quality. Empirical evidence supporting the model is presented.
Introduction
During crises episodes, the course of action of the government is always subject to a great deal of controversy. No consensus is ever achieved between those who, on the one side, champion the idea of government intervention and those who, on the other, believe in the self-correcting force of markets. Ex-post, government intervention might be required, if the state of affairs is not to 5 be aggravated; ex-ante, if government intervention is taken for granted whenever bad outcomes happen, risks might be taken in excess.
The way the government behaves in crises episodes has an impact on the payoff of virtually any asset. The reason is that, at least to some degree, there is always a correlation between an asset's payoff and the state of fundamentals of the economy -those factors that indicate how 10 well the economy is performing, and the very same factors the government aims at upon an intervention. Affecting assets' payoffs, the government turns out to play an important role in the investment decision of agents, which in turn affects the demand for assets and, consequently, their prices. Assets' prices are part of the state of fundamentals, causing the action of the government to feed back into itself. Figure 1 illustrates this process.
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One example of the process above is the case of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the financial crisis episode of [2008] [2009] . MBS are securities whose payoffs derive from a pool of mortgages, assembled together an issued as a single asset, a process known as securitization.
Securitization creates a secondary market for loans, which helps financial institutions in the transfer of risks, making it easier for them to offer new mortgages.
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Of prominent role in this secondary market is Fannie Mae, a company created by the U.S. government in 1938, with the goal of fostering the level of home ownership. Initially established as a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), it was converted into a publicly traded company in 1968. This change of ownership altered its government guarantee status, from being explicit pre-1968 to being implicit pos-1968. 25 This implied government guarantee would constitute arc number 1 in Figure 1 . Since the payoff of a MBS is dependent on the payment of loans it embeds, it is an instrument with a great deal of credit risk. Therefore, the support from the U.S. government conferred to the securities traded by Fannie Mae a lot of appeal, increasing the demand for them, which would be arc number 2. take a mortgage, and together with that came a decrease in lending standards. The increased demand for houses arguably inflated a bubble, arc number 3, and, when the high level of prices could not be sustained anymore, those disqualified borrowers had no ways of fulfilling their 35 obligations. By the time, a great fraction of the mortgage market was owned by Fannie Mae, whose collapse would pose a serious threat to all of those invested in assets like MBS, making government intervention inevitable, arc number 4, completing the process depicted in Figure 1 .
Defining a scenario by the precision of the signals received by the agents of the economy, the effects from the possibility of government intervention should be related to how precise the 40 information available to the agents is. For, agents considering to invest in a risky asset would value more the possibility of an intervention in a scenario with less informative signals, since accurate signals would allow for a decision to be taken regardless of the policy chosen by the government: if the economy will perform well, agents buy the risky asset, otherwise they just invest in the riskless one.
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Following this logic, the goal of the paper is to study the effects on equilibrium prices of a policy whereby the government can intervene during a financial crisis, and how these effects are related to the scenario, or precision of information, under which assets are transacted. Not only that, the aim is to compare how those effects change when the government is able to commit to a policy of no intervention. In the setup to be presented, the criterium used by the government to 50 intervene is the social welfare of the agents, defined by the total sum of their portfolios' payoffs.
A financial crisis happens whenever this measure goes below a critical level, which results in the government intervening and the social welfare being restored to the critical level.
The problem faced by the agents is to form a portfolio that can consist of a riskless asset and an indivisible risky asset. The payoff of the risky asset is assumed to be perfectly correlated with 55 the state of fundamentals of the economy, modeled as a uniform random variable on the unit interval. The scenario in which agents make their decisions fall into one of the following three:
(i) imperfect information, where each agent receives a noisy private signal of the future payoff of the risky asset, (ii) perfect information, where every agent knows what the payoff of the risky asset will be and, (iii) common prior, where all that is known is the probability distribution of 60 the future payoff of the risky asset.
In terms of government intervention, two frameworks are studied, one where agents entertain the possibility of intervention, to be called the government intervention framework, and another one where agents rule out that possibility from the outset, the no government framework 1 .
In order to understand the effects from the interaction between agents' precision of informa-
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tion and the possibility of intervention, the equilibrium price for each combination of scenario and framework is derived and compared to each other, as illustrated in Figure 2 . Among the results obtained, it is showed that (i) the possibility of government intervention raises equilibrium prices, no matter what the informational scenario under which agents form their portfolios;
(ii) equilibrium prices cannot be sustained at particular high levels, and; (iii) the possibility of 70 government intervention matters only when the uncertainty faced by the agents is sufficiently high.
The reason why the possibility of government intervention raises equilibrium prices is that it operates as an insurance, in particular when the agents consider to buy the risky asset. If agents are to pay too high of a price for the risky asset, though, the strategy will be profitable only 75 at high realizations of the state of fundamentals. Given the uniform distribution assumed, such realizations are less likely, and therefore agents will choose to invest their entire endowment in the riskless asset. Thus, an equilibrium in which the risky price is transacted at high prices will fail to hold.
That the possibility of intervention matters only when the uncertainty faced by the agents is 80 sufficiently high shows how pervasive can changes in the quality of information be, and how the possibility of government intervention can amplify the effects from that. For instance, compared to the framework with no possibility of intervention, the models predicts jumps in asset prices when agents entertain the possibility of the government stepping in and the precision of the information held by agents deteriorate, causing more volatility in prices. 85
Related Literature
The paper relates mainly to two strands of literature, one analyzing the effects of the quality of information on assets prices, and another studying the consequences for asset pricing of the possibility of government intervention during crises.
Regarding the effects of the quality of information on asset prices, models were developed and 90 empirical studies were performed focusing on the implications for interest rates and bond prices (Dothan and Feldman (1986), Feldman (1989) ), portfolio choice (Genotte (1986 ), Detemple (1986 ) stock market fluctuations and predictability of asset returns (Barsky and DeLong (1993) , Timmermann (1993) , Wang (1993) , Veronesi (2000) , Brennan and Xia (2001) , Ai (2010) ), effects of central bank and stock exchanges transparency (Rhee and Turdaliev (2013) , Ke et al. (2013) ),
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and cost of equity capital (He et al. (2013) ), among others. Most of these papers, particularly the theoretical ones, explore a dynamic setting where learning plays a crucial role, differently from the present paper which is developed in a static setting with no updating of information whatsoever. Another difference is that, whereas the aforementioned papers explore questions related to stock returns, the interest here is on the level of stock prices.
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Another strand of the literature that also touches on the issue of the relation between information quality and asset prices is that of ambiguity, as surveyed in Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013) .
Particularly relevant to the present paper is Epstein and Schneider (2008) . Despite not explicitly considering the possibility of government intervention, Epstein and Schneider show that information quality can have negative effects on asset prices even when fundamentals do not change, 105 a result that is also obtained here.
Models of ambiguity can also explain market non-participation, by modeling agents as having ambiguity aversion preferences (Cao et al. (2005) , Antoniou et al. (2014) In terms of the effects arising from the possibility of government intervention during crises, in particular financial ones, the literature addresses questions regarding optimal policy, e.g., interest rate versus bailout interventions (Farhi and Tirole (2012) , Diamond and Rajan (2012) ), banks' ex-ante choice of liquidity (Acharya et al. (2011) ), incentives for failure Acharya and Yorulmazer 115 (2007) , bank runs Ennis and Keister (2009) , effects on option prices (Kelly et al. (2012) ), central bank's policy impact on Tobin's q (Faria et al. (2012) ), and consequences of monetary policy shocks (Tsai (2014) ), to cite a few. Apart from the analysis of Kelly et al., none of these papers addresses the question of how government's intervention policy affect the level of equilibrium prices, which is the main focus here.
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In the model to be developed, agents might have information which makes them unaware of the intervention decision of the government. However, there is no uncertainty whatsoever regarding the policy to be followed by the government in case an intervention does happen, a question pursued by Pastor and Veronesi (2012) and, indirectly, by Gospodinov and Jamali (2014) . Regarding the model of Pastor and Veronesi, whereas the assumption of uncertainty 125 about both government's action and their impact leads to excess volatility in asset returns, unawareness about intervention leads to excess volatility in asset price levels in the present paper.
The empirical section of the paper assumes that consumer sentiment has an effect on asset prices, and this effect relates to the characteristics of the assets, which here are defined in terms of 130 the quality of the information available. Similar to that is the analysis in Corredor et al. (2013) , where a comparison of investors' sentiment effect on stock prices is carried out considering also country-specific characteristics.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 introduces the model, with the corresponding measure of social welfare upon which the government bases its intervention decision; section perfect and common prior information); empirical evidence supporting the model is presented in section 6; section 7 concludes. The derivation of some of the results is delegated to the appendix.
Model
The model consists of a continuum of agents, represented by the unit mass interval, I = • t = 0: nature draws the state of fundamentals θ from a uniform distribution θ ∼ U [0, 1];
• t = 1: agents decide whether to buy or not, 
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-Common prior scenario: agents know only the probability distribution of the state of fundamentals, and this information is common knowledge.
• t = 2: the government decides whether to intervene or not, according to the framework:
-Government framework: the government anticipates the social welfare level (to be defined) that results from agents' investment strategies and decides whether to intervene 160 or not;
-No government framework: no intervention whatsoever ensues since the government is absent from the outset.
• t = 3: agents liquidate their portfolios and consume the proceeds arising from that. 
If an agent chooses to buy, X i = 1, she gets the payoff from the asset, θ, plus whatever is left from the initial endowment after the asset was purchased, A − p. On the other hand, by not buying, X i = 0, an agent keeps her total endowment, A, for later consumption.
In the framework with the presence of the government, intervention occurs whenever social welfare goes below a certain threshold, C. Social welfare, S, is defined as the sum across the 175 agents of the proceeds from their investment strategies, before the government decides whether or not to intervene, expressed as:
The condition for intervention is:
If this condition is satisfied, the government intervenes and social welfare is restored to C.
Together with the market clearing condition, 1 0 X i di = 1, this implies that, whenever there is 180 government intervention, the state of fundamentals that the agents of the economy will end up facing is θ * , given by:
Thus, the condition for the government to intervene is met whenever the realization of θ is sufficiently low, i.e., θ < θ * . The interesting case is when A > C, for whenever the government steps in the resulting state of fundamentals is such that agents cannot fully recover the amount 185 invested: from (4), conditional on government intervention, the strategy of buying the asset yields θ * − p = C − A < 0. Also, A < C would imply government intervention even when no agent invests, which is not plausible given the measure of social welfare chosen.
Summarizing, the problem faced by each agent is to build a portfolio whose future payoff depends not only on the state of fundamentals of the economy, but also on the decision of the 190 government to intervene or not, which in turn is a function of social welfare. The possibility of intervention affects agents' problem since it works as an insurance mechanism, as it is shown in the sequence.
Framework with the Possibility of Intervention
In the framework with the presence of the government, agents are aware of the possibility 195 of intervention. Since government's action affects the payoff of the risky asset, when building their portfolios agents need to determine the probability of an intervention happening. Beliefs are formed in accordance with the informational scenario at hand, i.e., imperfect, perfect or common prior information as described in Section 2. The imperfect information scenario is analyzed first.
Imperfect Information
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In the imperfect information scenario, each agent i receives a noisy private signal ξ i about the state of fundamentals. Signals are uniformly distributed around the realized value, ξ ∼
Agents know that θ is at most τ units away from the signal received,
An equilibrium is defined as:
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Definition 1. An equilibrium is a collection of decision rules, X = X i | X i ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ I , and price p ∈ R ++ , such that:
(ii) market clears:
1 0 is the probability of intervention conditional on the information received, i.e., the probability
. This probability in turn depends on the price of the asset, since θ * is a function of p as defined in (4).
on the price being p and having received a signal ξ i such that (I) holds, agent i knows that there will be no government intervention. Thus:
In (II), agents cannot rule out the possibility of government intervention and, accordingly, they calculate the expected value of the state of fundamentals as:
Finally, in (III) agents know that there will be intervention, resulting in:
Given all the three possible cases, the objective function in (5), U i (X i ; ξ i , A, p), can be rewritten as:
where I (I) is the indicator function for case (I), namely
zero otherwise, and similarly for I (II) and I (III) .
Agents can secure their entire wealth for consumption in the final period, and since they 230 must satisfy a budget constraint, the optimal strategy will be X i = 1 in case the following two conditions are satisfied:
Using (12), inequality (13) can be equivalently written as:
Hence, assuming that the budget constraint is satisfied, condition (15) is the pivotal one in determining whether an agent chooses to buy the risky asset or not. The equilibrium price is 235 the only variable endogenously determined in the definition of θ * , and thus to each equilibrium price there is an associated likelihood of government intervention given by θ * . The equilibrium price and the likelihood of government intervention are two sides of the same coin, determined jointly.
According to the price, p, the corresponding critical level of intervention θ * falls in one of the 240 following intervals:
In intervals (i), (ii) and (iii), intervention does not occur in equilibrium, whereas in intervals (iv), (v) and (vi) it does. One would expect an equilibrium to be more likely to emerge in the intervals associated with a higher θ * , after all those are the ones where investing in the asset is 250 supposedly safer due to a higher possibility of intervention. However, it is also true for those cases that the price to be paid to acquire the asset, p, is higher, making the buying decision less attractive. It is the interaction of these two opposite effects that ultimately determines the overall likelihood of having an equilibrium in a particular interval.
Moving from interval (i) to (vi), agents' uncertainty, or unawareness, changes from being 255 related to the fact that the government does not intervene to the fact that the government does intervene. From interval (i) to (iii), accurate signals indicate that the government will not intervene, whereas from (iv) to (vi) accurate signals indicate that the government will intervene.
In intervals (i), (ii) and (iii), government intervention does not take place in equilibrium and no agent mistakenly believes that such an intervention would certainly occur. The mass of
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agents knowing exactly what the government behavior will be gets progressively smaller, as one goes from interval (i) to (iii). For instance, in interval (i), everyone knows the government will not intervene, in (ii) a fraction of the investors knows there will not be intervention and in (iii) a relatively smaller mass of agents acknowledges that the government will not intervene, even
though this is what happens in equilibrium.
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In intervals (iv), (v) and (vi), government intervention does take place, with no agent mistakenly ruling out such a possibility. Differently from the previous intervals, however, the mass of agents who know exactly what the government behavior will be gets progressively larger, as one moves from interval (iv) to (vi). In interval (iv), some agents know that the government will intervene, in (v) a relatively larger fraction of the investors acknowledges that and in (vi) 270 everyone knows how the government will react.
Formalizing the argument, recall that intervention ensues if and only if θ ∈ [0, θ * ), and that agents receive noisy private signals distributed as
, to be called individual range of uncertainty, for each agent i ∈ I.
The union of the individual ranges of uncertainty,
called total range of uncertainty. In interval (i), it holds that 0 ≤ θ * ≤ θ − 2τ , hence no agent
and since θ * increases as one moves along the intervals, the fraction of agents unaware of the fact the government does not intervene becomes larger.
In intervals (iv) and (v), no agent can rule out the possibility of government intervention, 280 since for both it is true that [0, θ * ) ∩ [θ − 2τ, θ + 2τ ] = ∅. Again using the fact that θ * increases with the intervals, the fraction of agents aware of the fact the government does intervene becomes larger, the extreme case being interval (vi), where everyone knows what the government's course of action will be: (θ
A measure of the level of unawareness of government's equilibrium action, defined as the 285 fraction of investors that is uncertain about the behavior of the government, i.e., intervention or not, is depicted in Figure 4 , called degree of confusion. According to the previous discussion, the degree of confusion is a function of the critical level of government intervention, θ * .
In deriving the equilibrium price, the magnitude of the dispersion parameter τ relative to the downside risk A − C is the key factor defining the functional form of p. The high (low)
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uncertainty case is the one where τ > (<) A − C. Recall that τ is the parameter that defines how disperse is the range of uncertainty of each agent, and also the support of the distribution of signals: a higher τ means both that investors contemplate a larger interval where the realized θ might lie and also that the signals are more spread out. The characterization of the equilibrium price according to the dispersion parameter τ is given in Table 1 . The effects on the equilibrium price, p, of changes in the state of fundamentals θ, wealth A, insurance C and dispersion parameter τ are given by:
The equilibrium price of the risky asset is increasing in both the state of fundamentals and the insurance provided by the government, whereas it is decreasing in the wealth of investors and the dispersion parameter. The only counter-intuitive of these results relates to p decreasing in the wealth A of agents, and the reason for that is twofold. First, agents can only buy a single 305 unit of the risky asset, thus the demand for it does not necessarily increase when agents become wealthier. Second, agents are allowed to carry their entire endowment for future consumption, so increasing its level makes choosing the riskless asset more attractive relative to buying the risky one.
Another result is that no equilibrium price exists such that the critical level of government 310 intervention, θ * , lies in interval (vi), where it would be at its highest. Equivalently, no equilibrium price exists such that every agent is aware that government intervention will ensue. For, agents would be paying too high of a price to purchase the risky asset, and only upon an unlikely high realization of the state of fundamentals such a strategy would be worth. Facing a high price, therefore, investors prefer to abstain from buying the asset, which results in the market clearing 315 condition not being satisfied and an equilibrium failing to hold.
This non-existence of equilibrium could be related to the burst of a bubble, indicating the impossibility of prices being supported at extremely high levels. As bubble burst episodes are related to a lack of demand to keep prices increasing, so it is this non-existence of equilibrium also caused by an insufficient mass of investors willing to buy the risky asset, despite high prices 320 signaling a higher probability of government intervention in case the risky asset performs poorly.
Perfect Information
In the perfect information scenario, agents know the realized state of fundamentals, θ. Based on the price of the risky asset, they acknowledge if an intervention will follow or not. The critical level of government intervention, θ * , leads to one of the two following outcomes:
In (i) the government does not intervene, whereas in (ii) it does. Investors' maximization problem is:
Therefore, in case agents can afford to buy the asset, A ≥ p, they choose X i = 1 only if
If this is the case, A > C implies that:
which means that an equilibrium can be supported only in the range where there is no government intervention.
The reason why an equilibrium cannot be supported when agents anticipate an intervention 335 by the government is the same as in the imperfect information scenario, i.e., they acknowledge that the price of the risky asset is too high and therefore it is not worth to buy it. This implies that the market clearing conditions does not hold, and hence an equilibrium fails to exist.
Defining p P I as the equilibrium price in the perfect information scenario, in equilibrium it follows that p P I ≤ θ. As a benchmark for comparison later, one takes the equilibrium price in 340 the present informational scenario to be:
which is the maximum price investors would be willing to pay knowing the government will not act.
Following the expression of the equilibrium price, the comparative statics are straightforward:
the price is increasing in the state of fundamentals. There is no downside risk to be considered 345 by the investors since they know what the payoff of the asset will be. Because of that, the wealth level A and the government insurance parameter C do not appear in the equilibrium price and thus do not matter in terms of comparative statics.
No Information: Common Prior About the Fundamentals
The common prior scenario refers to the case where the only information known by the agents 350 is the distribution of θ, given by θ ∼ U [0, 1]. Agents' problem is now:
s.t. A ≥ p if X i = 1.
As usual, agents acknowledge that intervention takes place only if θ < θ * , a condition which is equivalent to θ < C − A + p, as in (4). Also, agents know that, upon government intervention, the state of fundamentals is set at θ * . Hence:
In case agents can afford to buy the asset, A ≥ p, they choose X i = 1 only if:
Taking the constraint in (22) to be binding, the equilibrium price in the common prior scenario, denoted by p CP , is given by:
With p CP as the equilibrium price, the fact that θ * ∈ [0, 1] requires A − C < 1/2, and with that one has the following comparative statics of the equilibrium price:
As before, the only counter-intuitive result is the equilibrium price decreasing in the wealth of investors. The explanation is the same given previously: an increase in A makes the option of saving the entire wealth for future consumption more attractive, and, together with the fact that agents are allowed to buy at most one unit of the risky asset, it holds that p CP A < 0. 
Equilibrium Prices Across the Informational Scenarios
After deriving the equilibrium prices prevailing in each informational scenario, this section proceeds with the intra framework, inter scenario analysis of Figure 2 . By ranking the equilibrium prices across the informational scenarios one can assess the impact of information on asset prices.
The equilibrium prices to be compared are:
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(i) Imperfect information:
• p IP = θ − τ (low uncertainty).
(ii) Perfect information: p P I = θ;
(iii) Common prior:
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As mentioned in the derivation of p CP in (23), an extra assumption required is 0 < A − C < 1/2. With this assumption in place, it is shown in the appendix -Propositions 3 and 4 -that the ordering of equilibrium prices across the informational scenarios will depend on the realization of the state of fundamentals. In particular, for both cases of low uncertainty and high uncertainty, i.e., low and high levels of τ , there exists θ and θ such that, for a sufficiently high level of the 380 state of fundamentals θ, i.e., θ ∈ θ, 1 , the ordering of equilibrium prices is given by:
whereas for an intermediate level, i.e., θ ∈ θ, θ , the ordering is:
and, finally, if the state of fundamentals is sufficiently low, i.e., θ ∈ (0, θ), it follows that:
For any level of θ, therefore, the equilibrium price under perfect information, p P I , is higher than the one prevailing in a scenario of imperfect information, p IP , which reflects the value of realization of θ is high. This leads to p CP > p P I > p IP whenever θ ∈ (0, θ), and p P I > p IP > p CP when θ ∈ θ, 1 .
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The ordering of equilibrium prices shows that changes in the informational scenario faced by agents leads to changes in asset prices even without a concomitant change in the state of fundamentals. This is important because it highlights the fact that the environment where trade occurs, with its specific information structure, can create volatility in asset prices that otherwise would not be warranted.
395
As a thought experiment, consider the case where information is not disseminated properly in the economy, leading agents to make their decisions based only on the knowledge of the distribution of returns of the risky asset. If one considers the fundamental price of the risky asset as the one prevailing in the perfect information scenario without informational frictions, then the model says that positive bubbles would exist when the state of fundamentals is low and 400 negatives bubbles when it is high, since in the former case one has p CP > p P I , whereas in the later p P I > p CP . In terms of government policy, therefore, one implication of the model would be that measures aiming at improving the quality of the information known by the agents would lead to a correction in prices.
Framework without the Possibility of Intervention
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In the framework with the absence of the government, agents rule out the possibility of intervention from the outset, regardless of the realization of the state of fundamentals. As for the framework with the possibility of government intervention, this section derives the equilibrium prices under different informational scenarios, which are then compared to each other. The imperfect information scenario is discussed first. 
Imperfect Information About the Fundamentals
In the imperfect information scenario with no possibility of government intervention, it follows from (6) that E θ | ξ i = ξ i , and from (15) that agents opt to buy the risky asset only if ξ i ≥ p and the budget constraint is satisfied, i.e., A ≥ p. The market clearing condition is:
Hence, the higher the dispersion parameter, τ , the lower the price of the risky asset emerging 415 in equilibrium. Also, the functional form of the equilibrium price coincides with the one prevailing in the imperfect information scenario with the possibility of intervention and low uncertainty, given in Table 1 . There, the equilibrium price does not depend on government's insurance policy since such an insurance is irrelevant when the of uncertainty faced by agents is low, whereas here the government insurance parameter does not appear in the expression of the equilibrium price 420 since there is no government whatsoever in the current framework.
Also, whereas changes in the level of uncertainty lead to discontinuous changes in prices in the framework with the possibility of intervention, as given by Table 1 , here such a discontinuity is not present by virtue of the fact that a unique expression of the equilibrium price holds, regardless of the level of τ . This implies that the possibility of government intervention creates
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an excess volatility in prices that would not exist otherwise.
Perfect Information About the Fundamentals
In the perfect information scenario, agents' maximization problem is:
Therefore, in case agents can afford to buy the asset, A ≥ p, they choose X i = 1 only if:
For later comparison, the constraint in (28) is taken to be binding, and therefore the equilib-430 rium price when agents have perfect information is given by:
which is the same as in the framework with the possibility of government intervention.
No Information: Common Prior About the Fundamentals
Finally, the focus turns to the case where agents do not receive any signal, being aware only of the distribution of θ, given by θ ∼ U [0, 1]. Agents' problem is:
With no possibility of intervention, it follows that:
If the constraint in (32) is binding, the equilibrium price is given by:
Hence, in the common prior scenario without the government, the equilibrium price is simply the expected value of the random variable representing the payoff of the risky asset. 
Equilibrium Prices Across the Informational Scenarios
Given the equilibrium prices holding in each of the informational scenarios, namely p N G (imperfect), p N GP (perfect) and p N GC (common prior), the same analysis as in the framework with the possibility of intervention is performed now, namely the intra framework, inter scenario comparison of Figure 2 . The objective is, again, to assess the impact of information on equilibrium 445 prices, taking into account that agents cannot rely on the government to absorb potential losses from an investment in the risky asset.
The equilibrium prices are:
Similarly to the analysis in the framework with the possibility of government intervention,
Proposition 5 in the appendix shows that exists θ and θ such that, for a high realization of θ,
i.e., θ ∈ θ, 1 , the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
whereas for an intermediate level, i.e., θ ∈ θ, θ :
and, finally, if the state of fundamentals is sufficiently low, i.e., θ ∈ (0, θ):
The ordering of equilibrium prices is, therefore, similar to the one obtained in the framework with the possibility of intervention. Regardless of the realization of θ, it is always the case that
e., the equilibrium price in the perfect information scenario is always higher than the one prevailing when investors have imperfect information: better (perfect) information 460 commands a higher price than worse (imperfect) information.
For a sufficiently low realization of the state of fundamentals, 0 < θ < 1/2, the unconditional expected value assigned by the agents to the asset's payoff, 1/2, is higher than the value one would expect in both the perfect and imperfect information scenarios, thus higher is the equilibrium price, p N GC , compared to what would be agreeable in the other scenarios. This argument is 465 reversed for a sufficiently high state of fundamentals, i.e., for 1/2 + τ ≤ θ ≤ 1, in which case p N GC is the lowest of the equilibrium prices.
The ranking of equilibrium prices shows that, even without concomitant changes in the state of fundamentals, changes in the precision of information should cause changes in prices. Therefore, the previous remark that changes in the informational scenario bring excess volatility in prices 470 holds here as well.
Government vs No Government Prices
From the analysis of the two frameworks, i.e., with and without the possibility of government intervention, across the different informational scenarios, i.e., imperfect, perfect and common prior information, the conclusion is that, overall, prices respect the following order:
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• For a sufficiently high realization of the state of fundamentals, the equilibrium price under perfect information is the highest, whereas the lowest equilibrium price is reached in the common prior scenario;
• For a moderate realization of the state of fundamentals, the perfect information scenario leads to the highest price, whereas it is the imperfect information scenario that leads to 480 the lowest;
• For a sufficiently low realization of the state of fundamentals, the equilibrium price in the common prior scenario is the highest, whereas the lowest equilibrium price is reached in the imperfect information scenario.
The possibility of government intervention, therefore, does not alter the ordering of equilib-
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rium prices, when a comparison is made across the different informational scenarios. The other results that follow are:
• Changes in the information structure creates excess volatility by leading to changes in prices even when the state of fundamentals remains constant;
• The possibility of intervention makes equilibrium prices to be more volatility, by inducing 490 a discontinuity in prices when the level of uncertainty in the economy changes from low to high in the imperfect information scenario;
• If the equilibrium price of the risky asset under the scenario of perfect information is to be deemed as the fundamental one, situations where agents can rely only on minimal information such as the distribution of fundamentals, positive bubbles exist when the state 495 of fundamentals is low and negative bubbles when it is high.
Being an insurance, the possibility of government intervention should intuitively make equilibrium prices higher than the equilibrium prices in the framework without the possibility of intervention. This is the result obtained in turn by performing the inter framework, intra scenario analysis of Figure 2 . 
Imperfect Information
In the imperfect information scenario with the possibility of government intervention, the equilibrium price depends on the uncertainty level faced by agents. From Table (1) :
Without the possibility of intervention, the equilibrium price is, from (27), given by:
In the low uncertainty case, τ < A − C, the equilibrium price in the two frameworks coincide,
i.e., p IP = p N G . The reason is that, with low uncertainty, agents' information is accurate enough and allows them to decide whether to buy or not the risky asset regardless of the possibility of intervention. In the high uncertainty scenario, however, the possibility of government intervention 510 turns out to be essential in agents' investment decision. Comparing the equilibrium prices across the frameworks with and without intervention, one has:
By definition, under high uncertainty it holds that τ > A − C, which in turn implies (37) being true, and hence
Therefore, combining the low and the high uncertainty cases, the equilibrium price is at 515 least as high with the possibility of government intervention as it would be without. This goes according to what one would expect, as government intervention represents an insurance associated with the risky asset and as such should be reflected positively in the equilibrium price.
Perfect Information
In the perfect information scenario, the equilibrium price is the same in both frameworks,
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with and without the participation of the government, i.e.:
Recall that, in the framework with the possibility of intervention, the equilibrium price is always such that the government ends up not intervening, and this is the reason why the equilibrium price is identical to that in the framework without the possibility of intervention.
Common Prior
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When agents only have knowledge of the distribution of the state of fundamentals, the equilibrium price in the framework with the possibility of government intervention is given by:
whereas in the framework without the possibility of intervention it is:
It follows that:
The assumption that 0 < A − C < 1/2 and the fact that the right-hand side is increasing in
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A − C implies that (41) holds, and therefore
The reason is straightforward: since agents do not receive any information regarding the level of the state of fundamentals, all they calculate is the unconditional expectation of θ. In the framework without the possibility of intervention, that expectation is taken over the whole support of the distribution of θ, whereas in the framework with the possibility of intervention 535 the support is truncated at the critical level of intervention, after all agents know that the payoff of the asset will not be lower than that. This truncation makes the expected value of the state of fundamentals higher in the framework with the possibility of intervention than in the one without, and the same goes for the equilibrium prices.
Frameworks and Informational Scenarios Combined
540
Combining the conclusions obtained after a comparison across frameworks of equilibrium prices under each informational scenario, the main result is the following:
Proposition 2. Regardless of the informational scenario faced by investors being one of imperfect, perfect, or common prior information, the resulting equilibrium price is at least as high in the framework with the possibility of intervention as in the one without. 
Empirical Evidence
This section digresses on the main testable implications of the model, i.e., the ranking of equilibrium prices under different informational scenarios as a function of the state of fundamentals, and the positive effect of the possibility of government intervention on equilibrium prices.
Ranking of Equilibrium Prices
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The model asserts that equilibrium prices should respect a particular ordering according to the realized state of fundamentals, and this should hold regardless of the possibility of government intervention.
In order to test this hypothesis, it is used the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to assemble the data used herein 2 . In 555 particular, the series used are the Consumer Sentiment Index compiled by the University of Michigan, and the Price Index for small, mid and large capitalization firms in the U.S. calculated
by Wilshire. All the data is publicly available.
The Consumer Sentiment Index is used as a proxy for the state of fundamentals and, as such, the higher it is, the better the overall shape of the economy. The informational scenarios 560 are proxied by the capitalization of U.S. firms, the assumption being that agents have more information about a firm, the better capitalized the firm is. This leads to the perfect scenario being associated to large capitalization firms, the imperfect scenario to mid capitalization firms, and the common prior scenario to small capitalization firms. From visual inspection, the time series of the Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) appears to have three breakdates. In order to test for multiple breaks, it is used the methodology developed by Bai (1997) . As discussed in Hansen (2001) , the idea is that, if taken as a function of the 570 breakdate, the mean square error will be at a local minimum near each break date.
Upon this idea, the following regression is run, taking each monthly data point in the range from June, 1996 , to March, 2014 , as a potential break date: where CSI t stands for the Consumer Sentiment Index at date t, d t is the dummy variable which equals 1 if t is after the breakdate and 0 otherwise, and x t = d t .CSI t−1 is the interaction 575 term. Figure 5 plots the mean square error for all the regressions, as a function of each possible breakdate.
There are three local minima, from which we take two as representing the breakdates of the Consumer Sentiment Index 3 , namely November, 2000, and January, 2007 . The breakdates are plotted as dashed lines in Figure 6 .1, dividing the Consumer Sentiment Index in three periods,
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according to which the state of fundamentals of the economy is properly defined:
• High state of fundamentals: from June, 1996, to November, 2000;
• Intermediate state of fundamentals: from December, 2000, to January, 2007;
• Low state of fundamentals: from February, 2007 , to March, 2014 . • 
Effects on Prices from the Possibility of Intervention
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According to Proposition 2, the possibility of government intervention should command higher equilibrium prices regardless of the informational scenario under which agents make their decisions. It is not straightforward to test this hypothesis, as it requires two assets similar in every dimension other than the possibility of intervention.
To circumvent this problem, it is assumed that the government follows a too-big-to-fail policy 620 for which only large capitalization firms are eligible, but not mid and small ones. Also, it is assumed that the quality of information for large, mid and small capitalization firms is the same.
Under these assumptions, the model predicts that the price index of large firms, p l , should be higher than the corresponding one of mid and small companies, p m and p s , respectively. Not only that, given that the possibility of intervention is enjoyed only by large firms, the price index 625 of mid and small capitalization firms should track each other closely.
Because the uncertainty about the possibility of government intervention was resolved in much tighter than that when the comparison is between the price index of large capitalization firms and that of mid and small ones. Since the assumption is that only large capitalization firms are eligible for a too-big-to-fail policy, this corroborates the predictions of the model that the possibility of government intervention leads to higher equilibrium prices.
Concluding Remarks
640
This paper studies the impact on equilibrium prices that would result from a policy whereby the government provides free insurance against the fall of agents' welfare below a particular level, as opposed to a framework where the government is credible in its commitment to not intervene. This problem is analyzed under different scenarios, with agents having different precision of information in each of them.
645
It is showed that regardless of a framework with or without the possibility of intervention, the comparison of equilibrium prices across different informational scenarios respect a particular ordering determined by the realized state of fundamentals. This ordering implies that changes in the informational scenario faced by agents lead to changes in the equilibrium prices even without changes in the underlying state of fundamentals, hence creating excess volatility in prices. By 650 inducing a discontinuity in prices when the uncertainty of agents changes from low to high in a scenario of imperfect information, the possibility of intervention makes prices to be even more volatile.
If the fundamental price of the risky asset is assumed to be the one prevailing in a perfect information scenario, situations where agents discard signals and instead base their investment 655 decisions only on the probability distribution of the asset's return lead to positive bubbles when the realized state of fundamentals is high and negative bubbles when the realized state is low.
This implies that a policy whereby the government makes the market better informed should have a positive effect in terms of a correction of prices.
Finally, by working as an insurance mechanism, the possibility of government intervention 660 leads to an increase in prices, and this effect is verified regardless of the informational scenario faced by the agents.
A. Comparison of Equilibrium Prices across Different Scenarios in the Government
Intervention Framework Proposition 3. In the framework with the possibility of government intervention and low uncertainty scenario, i.e., 0 < τ < A − C < 1/2, and equilibrium prices given by:
(i) Imperfect information: p IP = θ − τ ;
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(iii) Common prior: p CP = 1 + A − C − 2 (A − C) ; the following holds:
• For a sufficiently high level of the state of fundamentals, θ:
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
• For an intermediate level of θ:
• For a sufficiently low level of θ:
proof. Since τ > 0, it follows trivially that p P I > p IP . Comparing p IP to p CP one has:
Therefore, if (50) 
which implies that, for:
the ranking of prices is p P I ≥ p CP > p IP .
Finally, the last case is when:
and, from the above, it follows that p CP > p P I > p IP , completing the proof. • For a sufficiently high level of the state of fundamentals, θ:
• For a low level of θ:
the ordering of equilibrium prices is
proof. Comparing p P I to p IP , it follows that:
which trivially holds since, by assumption, τ > A − C. 
Therefore, if (60) 
prices are ranked as p P I ≥ p CP > p IP .
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for which, using the above, p CP > p P I > p IP , completing the proof.
B. Comparison of Equilibrium Prices across Different Scenarios without Government Intervention
Proposition 5. In the framework without the possibility of government intervention, with 0 < 770 τ < 1/2 and equilibrium prices given by:
(i) Imperfect information: p N G = θ − τ ;
(ii) Perfect information: p N GP = θ;
(iii) Common prior: p N GC = 1/2. the following holds:
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• For a high realization of θ:
• For an intermediate realization of θ:
1/2 ≤ θ < 1/2 + τ,
• For a low realization of θ:
proof. Since τ > 0, it holds trivially that p N GP > p N G . Comparing p N G to p N GC one has:
and, therefore, if (70) is satisfied, it follows that p N GP > p N G ≥ p N GC . Otherwise one has to compare p N GP to p N GC :
implying that, if 1/2 ≤ θ < 1/2 + τ , then p N GP ≥ p N GC > p N G .
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The last case is when 0 < θ < 1/2, which yields that p N GC > p N GP > p N G , completing the proof.
